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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended), which is from a final 
Partial Summary Judgment entered by the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether American's cause of action against Bonneville for 
enforcement of a written guaranty agreement executed by Bonneville 
is subject to the statute of limitations for a deficiency action. 
2. Whether Bonneville may assert the "one-action rule", 
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1, as a defense where the mixed 
collateral loan obligation was secured by personal property and a 
guaranty agreement in addition to a deed of trust on real property. 
3. Whether the Guaranty Agreement, which expressly states 
that, upon default of the primary obligors, American need not first 
exhaust any other collateral or security or remedy before pursuing 
Bonneville is an absolute guaranty. 
4. Whether Bonneville may assert defenses which it expressly 
waived in the Guaranty Agreement. 
A. Whether the alleged discharge of the primary 
obligors because of Americanfs failure to exhaust all remedies 
discharges Bonneville where the Guaranty Agreement expressly 
waives any requirement of exhaustion. 
B. Whether a separate operating loan transaction 
between the primary obligors and American primarily secured by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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collateral different from that pledged under the initial loan 
transaction can be construed to be a material modification of 
the Guaranty Agreement. 
C. Whether a separate operating loan transaction, 
primarily secured by different collateral and to which 
Bonneville was not a party, can be construed to be a novation 
of the Guaranty Agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent American Savings & Loan Association (hereinafter 
"American") filed an action on or about April 26, 1989, in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, naming C. John Gibson, Lewis E. Young and Appellant 
Bonneville Industries, Inc. (hereinafter "Bonneville") as defen-
dants. (R. 2-42.) American's cause of action against Bonneville 
sought to enforce the terms of a written guaranty agreement 
executed by Bonneville on October 28, 1983. (R. 3-5.) 
Following service of the Complaint, Bonneville filed an Answer 
and discovery proceeded. (R. 46-52.) On November 29, 1989, 
American filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Bonneville. 
(R. 58-74.) Bonneville subsequently filed a cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment against American. (R. 75-133.) On April 23, 
1990, after hearing oral argument on both motions, the trial court, 
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, entered an Order granting 
American's Motion for Summary Judgment against Bonneville as to the 
2 
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issue of Bonneville's liability on the guaranty, but reserving the 
issue of the amount of damages for subsequent determination. The 
trial court also denied Bonneville's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against American, (R. 216-218.) In its ruling, the trial court 
expressly found as follows: 
The one-action rule found at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-37-1 does not apply to the enforcement by 
plaintiff of defendant Bonneville Industries, 
Inc.' s Guaranty in this case, the performance 
of defendants' obligations having been secured 
by a deed of trust on real property, an uncon-
ditional and absolute guaranty agreement and a 
perfected security interest in personal 
property. (R. 217.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 28, 1983, American made a loan to Gibson 
Cryogenics, Inc. ("Gibson Cryogenics") and C. John Gibson, 
individually. (R. 71.) The original principal amount of the loan 
was $1,100,000.00 and the loan monies were used to finance the 
purchase of the real property from which C. John Gibson and Gibson 
Cryogenics conducted business. (R. 175.) The seller of the real 
property was Bonneville, and $510,000.00 of the loan proceeds were 
paid directly to Bonneville, while $572,547.38 of the loan proceeds 
were paid to First Security Bank of Utah to pay off Bonneville's 
loan. (R. 175.) The loan was partially secured by a Deed of Trust 
on the improved real property, the proceeds thereof and the rents 
derived therefrom, and was further partially secured by a perfected 
security interest in personal property which included various 
3 
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pieces of equipment. (R. 71.) In addition, the described loan 
("the mixed collateral loan11) was guaranteed by Bonneville pursuant 
to a written Guaranty Agreement dated October 28, 1983, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Addendum "A". (R. 71.) 
Gibson Cryogenics and C. John Gibson eventually defaulted 
under the terms of the loan by failing to make payments when due. 
In 1986, Gibson Cryogenics filed a petition in bankruptcy. 
American moved for relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy 
case, and its motion was granted on March 16, 1988. (R. 71.) On 
August 8, 1988, a foreclosure sale was had on the real property 
which partially secured the loan obligation, and American was 
subsequently able to realize the sum of $283,000.00 from the sale 
of the real property. (R. 72.) The personal property collateral 
which was a significant part of the security for the mixed 
collateral loan was also sold, and the sum of $225,000.00 was 
realized. All monies received from the sale of the real property 
and personal property were applied to and reduced the mixed 
collateral loan obligation guaranteed by Bonneville. However, a 
deficiency remains owing on the loan obligation guaranteed by 
Bonneville after liquidation of all of the security, both realty 
and personalty, and application of the proceeds to the indebted-
ness. (R. 72-73.) Moreover, although Bonneville made inquiry as 
to whether American would sell the Promissory Note and Deed of 
Trust to it, and American indicated its willingness to sell, at no 
time has American received an offer to purchase from Bonneville. 
4 
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In addition to the described 1983 mixed collateral loan, in 
January of 1985, American made a revolving operating loan to Gibson 
Cryogenics and C. John Gibson in the original principal amount of 
$400,000.00. This revolving operating loan was secured primarily 
by accounts receivable generated by Gibson Cryogenics. (R. 175.) 
Most of the payments received by American were direct payments from 
Gibson Cryogenics customers to American and as the revolving loan 
was paid down, Gibson Cryogenics was permitted to reborrow the 
funds for continuing operating costs. (R. 175.) Although the 1985 
revolving operating loan, primarily secured by accounts receivable, 
was secondarily secured by the real property which also secured the 
1983 mixed collateral loan, no payments recpWed by American on the 
mixed collateral loan were credited to the revolving operating 
loan. Moreover, no payments received on the revolving operating 
loan were applied on the mixed collateral loan, nor could they be, 
because the mixed collateral loan was not secured by receivables 
generated by Gibson Cryogenics and the loan documentation did not 
permit American to apply account receivable monies to the 1983 
obligation. (R. 175-176.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
American properly brought an action against Bonneville seeking 
to enforce a written guaranty executed by Bonneville which 
guaranteed payment of a mixed collateral loan. American's claim 
against Bonneville is not barred by the statute of limitations 
5 
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applicable to deficiency actions, nor did Americanfs election to 
foreclose on the real and personal property pledged as collateral 
for the loan, thereby reducing the amount for which Bonneville was 
liable, in any way discharge Bonneville's obligations as guarantor. 
Moreover, since the relevant loan was secured by both realty and 
personalty, the "one-action rule" is not applicable. 
The Guaranty Agreement executed by Bonneville is an absolute 
and unconditional guaranty, and is enforceable according to its 
express terms. The defense of discharge of the primary obligtors, 
which was waived by Bonneville in the guaranty, is therefore not 
now available to Bonneville even if there were a factual basis for 
it. In addition, there is no basis for Bonneville's allegations 
that a separate loan transaction between American and the primary 
obligors constituted a material modification of the guaranty, or 
resulted in a novation. Finally, there are no genuine issues of 
material fact which would have precluded entry of summary judgment 
in favor of American on the legal issue of Bonneville's liability 
as guarantor. 
ARGUMENT 
The standard for appellate review of a trial court's entry of 
summary judgment as a matter of law is that of correctness, and no 
particular deference is afforded to the trial court's view of the 
law. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 
1989). Similarly, the standard for appellate review of the 
6 
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unambiguous language of a written agreement is also a correctness 
standard, Bettinqer v. Bettinqer, 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990). 
Applying the correctness standard to the trial courtfs determina-
tion under the undisputed material facts of, and law applicable to, 
this case, it is clear that the trial court properly entered 
summary judgment in favor of American. 
I. 
AMERICAN'S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
BONNEVILLE IS NOT A DEFICIENCY ACTION 
AND ONLY SEEKS TO ENFORCE THE WRITTEN 
GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED BY BONNEVILLE. 
Bonneville incorrectly characterizes Americanfs cause of 
action against Bonneville as an action for a deficiency arising 
after foreclosure. Bonneville then argues that American's action 
is barred because Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1953 as amended) 
provides a three-month limitation period within which a deficiency 
action must be brought. (Appellant's Brief at 14-16.) 
Bonneville's argument is without merit. Section 57-1-32 relates to 
collection of a deficiency against a mortgagor after extrajudicial 
sale of real property pledged as collateral. Bonneville is a 
guarantor, not the mortgagor, and did not pledge the real property 
as security for its obligation as a guarantor. Therefore, 
American's claim against Bonneville is not barred by § 57-1-32. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have found that a guaranty is an 
unsecured liability separate and distinct from a mortgage. In 
7 
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First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Gaiqe, 765 P.2d 683 (Idaho 
1988), the Court held that Idaho's anti-deficiency statute did not 
protect a guarantor from liability. Similarly, in Riverside 
National Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438 (Okla. 1980), the Court 
ruled that the obligation of a guaranty is independent and 
separately enforceable, so that a guarantor is not automatically 
discharged by a creditor's failure to seek a deficiency. See also 
Mandan Security Bank v. Heinzohn, 320 N.W.2d 494 (N.D. 1982) (North 
Dakota anti-deficiency statute did not apply to the guarantors, 
since the guaranty was a separate liability); Victory Highway 
Village, Inc. v. Weaver, 480 F. Supp. 71 (D. Minn. 1979) 
(guaranties were absolute and unconditional and provided a wholly 
distinct cause of action against the guarantor, entirely separate 
from a deficiency action against the mortgagor). 
In addition, the language of the Guaranty Agreement at issue 
specifically provides that, although American had no obligation to 
do so, if it chose to proceed with foreclosure pursuant to the 
terms of the Deed of Trust, it would "not be required to prosecute 
or institute proceedings to recover any deficiency as a condition 
of payment hereunder or endorsement hereof." 11 4. Since American 
had no obligation to file a deficiency action against C. John 
Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics as a prerequisite to seeking recovery 
on the guaranty from Bonneville, it would require this Court to 
violate the clear terms of the guaranty to find that American's 
claim against Bonneville is somehow barred by the deficiency 
8 
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statute of limitations. American's claim against Bonneville is 
not, nor could it be, a deficiency claim, but rather seeks enforce-
ment of the express terms of the separate written Guaranty 
Agreement executed by Bonneville, 
Bonneville also argues that American has discharged C. John 
Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics by failing to seek a deficiency 
judgment against them and has therefore released Bonneville from 
its obligations under the Guaranty Agreement. (Appellant's Brief 
at 16-19.) Again, Bonneville ignores the plain and undisputed 
language of the guaranty and tortures the facts. American could 
not have filed a deficiency action against Gibson Cryogenics 
because of the stay imposed by its bankruptcy filing. But even 
assuming, arguendo, that American could have pursued a deficiency 
against C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics and was obligated to 
do so, it is clear that no such obligation would run to Bonneville. 
The express terms of the written guaranty provide as follows: 
[N]o act or omission of any kind by 
Beneficiary [American] shall affect or impair 
this Guaranty, and Beneficiary shall have no 
duties to the Guarantor [Bonneville]. H 10. 
Bonneville also erroneously relies on Nevada Bank of 
Commerce v. Esquire Real Estate, 468 P.2d 22 (Nev. 1970) and on 
McGill v. Idaho Bank and Trust, 632 P.2d 683 (Idaho 1981) in 
support of its position. The first case discusses only novation, 
and the second case holds that where a guarantor contractually 
waives the defense of release of the principal debtor, as did the 
Bonneville, the guarantor will remain liable even though the 
defense of release might otherwise have been available. 
9 
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Thus, American's determination not to, or inability to, pursue a 
deficiency action against C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics in 
no way affects enforcement of the Guaranty Agreement against 
Bonneville. 
II. 
THE "ONE-ACTION RULE" DOES NOT 
PREVENT ENFORCEMENT OF A 
GUARANTY ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS. 
The "one-action rule", set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 
(1953 as amended), by its terms applies only to debts or rights 
"secured solely by mortgage upon real estate." It is undisputed 
that the obligation guaranteed by Bonneville, the mixed collateral 
loan, was secured by a trust deed on real estate, rents and 
proceeds, certain other valuable personal property and the Guaranty 
Agreement at issue. As the trial court correctly found, the mixed 
collateral loan guaranteed by Bonneville was not secured solely by 
a mortgage upon real estate and the one-action rule accordingly 
does not apply. 
This Court has previously held that the one-action rule 
applies only to actions between mortgagors and mortgagees and does 
not extend to third parties. Pillsbury Mills, Inc. v. Nephi 
Processing Plant, Inc., 323 P.2d 266 (Utah 1958). Furthermore, the 
written Guaranty Agreement executed by Bonneville is not a debt 
secured by real property at all, but rather is a separate, 
unsecured obligation. Even in the State of California, where a 
10 
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strong anti-deficiency sentiment prevails, courts have held that 
the one-action rule does not prevent a direct action against a true 
guarantor. United Cal. Bank v. Maltzman, 44 Cal. App. 3d 41, 118 
Cal. Rptr, 299 (Cal, App, 1974). Bonnevillefs arguments relating 
to the one-action rule thus fail to recognize the fact that the 
"one-action rule" applies neither to the mixed collateral loan nor 
to the separate Guaranty Agreement. 
III. 
THE WRITTEN GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED 
BY BONNEVILLE ON OCTOBER 28, 1983 
IS AN ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL GUARANTY. 
The trial court correctly found that the Guaranty Agreement at 
issue is "an unconditional and absolute guaranty agreement." In 
the case of Strevell-Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, 646 P.2d 741 
(Utah 1982), this Court articulated the difference between an 
absolute guaranty of payment and a mere guaranty of collection: 
[A] guarantee of payment is absolute, and the 
guaranteed party need not fix its losses by 
pursuing its remedies against the debt or the 
security before proceeding directly against 
the guarantor. (Emphasis in original, cites 
omitted.) 
In contrast, a guarantee of collection is 
conditional only, the guarantor's liability 
being dependent upon the creditor fs first 
exhausting its remedies against the debtor and 
any security before resorting to action 
against the guarantor. (Emphasis in original, 
cites omitted.) 
11 
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Id. at 743. See also Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete 
Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 1987). 
The written guaranty executed by Bonneville expressly provides 
that Bonneville "[unconditionally and absolutely guarantees the 
due and punctual payment of the principal of the Note, the interest 
thereon and any other monies due or which may become due 
thereon • . . .If f 1. The Guaranty Agreement further states that 
it may be enforced by American without the necessity of "first 
resorting to or exhausting any other security or collateral or 
without first having recourse to the Note or any of the property 
covered by the Deed of Trust or other document or instrument 
securing the Note. . .f!. 11 4. The guaranty finally specifically 
provides that the guarantor's obligations thereunder "shall be 
absolute and primary and shall be complete and binding upon this 
Guaranty being executed by it and subject to no condition precedent 
or otherwise." 11 11. Under Utah law then, the Guaranty Agreement 
at issue is an absolute guaranty of payment since it is in no way 
conditional. 
Despite the express language of the guaranty and the appli-
cable Utah law, Bonneville argues that by electing to foreclose on 
the real and personal property, American treated the guaranty as a 
"collateral guaranty". (Appellant's Brief at 22.) The language of 
the Guaranty Agreement itself is dispositive, however, in that the 
terms of paragraph 4 of the guaranty expressly provide that 
American's determination to foreclose and mitigate its losses in no 
12 
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way affects Bonneville's liability as an absolute guarantor. 
Moreover, this Court has previously held that a guarantor's 
"independent obligation" under an absolute guaranty is not affected 
by the creditor's actions in pursuance of the debtor: 
The fact that the creditor obtained a judgment 
against the debtor but failed to allege execu-
tion on that judgment or exhaustion of his 
remedies against the debtor or the security 
does not alter the nature of the guarantor's 
independent obligation as a guarantor. 
Strevell-Paterson at 744. 
It is thus clear that Bonneville's guaranty is absolute and 
that American was not required to first liquidate the available 
collateral prior to seeking enforcement of the guaranty, although 
American in fact did so to Bonneville's benefit and reduced the 
amount recoverable from Bonneville under the guaranty by the amount 
of monies received from the sale of the real and personal property 
collateral. 
IV. 
THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE 
ACCORDING TO ITS EXPRESS TERMS. 
Under Utah law, the specific terms of a guaranty are enforce-
able. For example, express waivers in a guaranty are enforceable 
against the guarantor. In Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way 
Concrete Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah 
Court of Appeals stated that a guarantor may waive its right to 
claim relief based upon an impairment of collateral. Ld. at 109. 
13 
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Similarly, in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Security 
Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985), this Court upheld a 
waiver in a guaranty which read, "[T]he liability of the 
Guarantor(s) shall not be affected, released or exonerated by 
release or surrender of any security held for payment of any debts 
hereinbefore mentioned . . .". In Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. 
Hydroswift Corp., 528 P.2d 156 (Utah 1974), this Court also upheld 
the express terms of an absolute guaranty and ruled that the 
guarantor was liable, despite its claim that the creditor's failure 
to repossess and sell the collateral operated as a release of its 
guaranty. 
In the case at bar, Bonneville seeks to now assert several 
defenses which it previously and expressly waived at the time it 
executed the Guaranty Agreement in 1983; namely, release of the 
primary obligors, material modification and novation. 
A. The alleged discharge of C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics 
is irrelevant to Bonneville's liability as guarantor. 
The terms of the Guaranty Agreement specifically and unequivo-
cally provide that Bonneville's liability is not conditioned upon 
any action taken by American against the principal obligors, but 
rather attaches at the time C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics 
default on the loan obligation guaranteed. In paragraph 1 of the 
Guaranty Agreement, Bonneville "unconditionally and absolutely 
guarantees the due and punctual payment" of the loan obligation; in 
14 
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paragraph 2, Bonneville agrees to remain liable until C. John 
Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics fully perform their obligations under 
the loan agreements, "notwithstanding any act, omission or thing 
which might otherwise operate as a legal discharge of the 
guarantor"; in paragraph 4 Bonneville agrees that the guaranty can 
be enforced by American without resorting first to the security or 
collateral, but if American determines to proceed with foreclosure, 
it shall not be required to prosecute or institute proceedings to 
recover a deficiency as a condition of payment under or endorsement 
of the guaranty; in paragraph 10 Bonneville agrees that no act or 
omission of any kind by American shall affect or impair the 
guaranty and that American shall have no duties to Bonneville; in 
paragraph 11 Bonneville agrees that its obligations as guarantor 
are absolute and are complete and binding upon execution of the 
guaranty and "subject to no conditions precedent or otherwise"; 
and, finally, in paragraph 15 Bonneville agrees that the obliga-
tions undertaken in the guaranty are continuing and irrevocable 
until the mixed collateral loan and related charges have been 
satisfied. 
In light of the unambiguous written terms of the Guaranty 
Agreement, Bonnevillefs attempts to now raise various affirmative 
defenses alleging that it has been released from its expressly 
undertaken guaranty obligations lack merit. Even if such defenses 
were supported by the facts, which they are not, no action 
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undertaken by American has in any way resulted in the release of 
Bonneville. 
B. The subsequent revolving operating loan of 1985 was not a 
material modification of the Guaranty Agreement, 
Bonneville also alleges that because the 1985 revolving 
operating loan was secondarily secured by the real property which 
partially secured the 1983 mixed collateral loan, a greater 
financial risk was placed upon Bonneville than was originally 
contemplated, resulting in a material modification of the Guaranty 
Agreement. (Appellant's Brief at 19-20.) Once again, the express 
and undisputed language of the guaranty provides otherwise. 
Paragraph 12 of the agreement states that the terms of the guaranty 
may not be changed or modified in any way except by a writing 
executed by American, and it is clear that the 1985 revolving 
operating loan was not, nor was it intended to be, a modification 
of the mixed collateral loan. In addition, Bonneville substan-
tially mischaracterizes the facts in order to make its argument 
appear plausible. In truth, the revolving operating loan of 1985 
was a completely separate loan transaction only marginally related 
to the loan obligation which Bonneville guaranteed. The revolving 
loan was secured primarily by accounts receivable and no payments 
received on the revolving operating loan were applied on the 1983 
mixed collateral loan, or vice versa. At all times American 
treated the loans separately. Thus, the $3 million referred to by 
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Bonneville in its brief as being monies which should have been 
applied to the 1983 mixed collateral loan was in fact payments 
received on the revolving operating loan which, under the relevant 
loan documents, could not have been applied to the 1983 mixed 
collateral loan. 
The case relied on by Bonneville, Carrier Brokers, Inc. v. 
Spanish Trail, 751 P.2d 258 (Utah App. 1988), is clearly distin-
guishable from the case at bar. Specifically, the guaranty at 
issue therein was a conditional guaranty which provided that the 
creditor would first pursue the collateral, Coca-Cola, prior to 
pursuing the guarantor. On those facts, the Utah Court of Appeals 
appropriately held that the guarantor was not liable where the 
monies guaranteed were in fact used to purchase fish, not Coca-
Cola, since that was not the parties1 bargain. Conversely, here 
the language of the Guaranty Agreement provides that Bonneville 
consents to "any and all substitutions, exchanges or releases of 
all or any part of the collateral therefore . . .". 11 2. 
Moreover, all that occurred by American taking the real property as 
secondary security for the 1985 revolving operating loan was that 
a lien was created against the real property junior to that imposed 
by the 1983 Deed of Trust, so that the security for the 1983 mixed 
collateral loan was unaffected. There was thus no material 
modification of the Guaranty Agreement. 
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C. The subsequent revolving loan agreement did not result in a 
novation. 
Under Utah law, for a novation to occur, there must be: 
(1) an existing and valid contract, (2) an 
agreement to the new contract by all parties, 
(3) a new valid contract, and (4) an extin-
guishment of the old contract by the new one. 
(Cites omitted.) 
Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1352-53 (Utah App. 1987).2 Under 
this standard, it is clear that there is no novation as between 
American and C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics or as between 
American and Bonneville. The subsequent revolving operating loan 
was a distinct transaction, with separate security given, which in 
no way was intended to or operated to extinguish any of the obliga-
tions undertaken by C. John Gibson and Gibson Cryogenics under the 
initial mixed collateral loan. More significantly, there was no 
subsequent agreement between American and Bonneville, the contract-
ing parties under the guaranty. As there was no novation as 
between American and the primary obligors, or between American and 
Bonneville, clearly then Bonneville has not been released from its 
obligations under the Guaranty Agreement. 
Bonneville alleges that the "novation" is evidenced by the 
fact that American would not sell the Promissory Note and Deed of 
The alleged case authority relating to novations cited by 
Appellant in its brief, Crested Butte Silver Mine, Inc. v. 
Candelaria Metals, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987) does not involve 
or discuss the issue of a novation at all, but rather discusses the 
legal doctrines of rescission and accord and satisfaction. 
Accordingly, it is of no relevance to Appellant's argument 
regarding novation. 
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Trust to Bonneville. (Appellant's Brief at 21-22.) Not only is 
that allegation irrelevant, but the record also demonstrates that 
American at no time received an offer from Bonneville to purchase 
the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust, although a preliminary 
inquiry was made by Bonneville and responded to affirmatively by 
American. There is thus no factual basis for Bonneville's novation 
argument. 
V. 
THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE. 
Summary judgment is properly granted if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact in dispute and if the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The material facts in this case are uncontroverted. 
Bonneville executed the guaranty. The guaranty is absolute and 
unconditional. Under the undisputable terms of the Guaranty 
Agreement, American had no duty or obligation to pursue the real 
and personal property pledged as collateral for the mixed 
collateral loan. Without having an obligation to do so, American, 
nonetheless, obtained relief from the bankruptcy stay and did 
foreclose the real and personal property security. American then 
properly credited the proceeds therefrom against the balance owing 
on the mixed collateral loan. The mixed collateral loan was not a 
loan secured solely by a mortgage on real property. 
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There is no factual basis for Bonneville's assertions that a 
novation occurred, or that there was a material alteration of the 
original contract. Mere allegations do not suffice to create a 
question of fact. In addition, the other so-called disputed facts 
alleged to exist by Bonneville -- that representations were made in 
the loan commitment which would result in no liability to 
Bonneville and that American did not properly apply payments and 
credits which served to release Bonneville -- are not factual 
issues at all as those questions are clearly answered by reference 
to the express unambiguous written terms of the relevant documents 
relating to the loan transactions. In particular, the loan 
commitment was superseded by the terms of the Deed of Trust, 
Promissory Note and Guaranty Agreement. And, the mixed collateral 
loan documents and the revolving operating loan documents clearly 
do not allow for application of payments and credits as urged by 
Bonneville. 
Having correctly found no genuine issues of material fact on 
the issue of Bonnevillefs liability to American, the trial court 
applied the appropriate law, found that the "one-action rule" did 
not apply and granted summary judgment for American against 
Bonneville on the issue of liability and denied Bonneville's cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment in favor of American and against Bonneville on the 
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issue of Bonneville's liability under the terms of the Guaranty 
Agreement should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of April, 1991. 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
TEETBOYER 
ANNELI R. SMITH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following this 15th day of April, 1991: 
Gerald M. Conder, Esq. 
466 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Bonneville 
Xl^^\ 
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GUARANTY AGREEMENT 
This Guaranty, made this 28th day of October, 1983, by Bonneville 
Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation, ("Guarantor") and Levis E. Young, 
individually, ("Additional Guarantor"), to and for the benefit of Aaerican 
Savings and Loan Association, a Utah corporation, ("Beneficiary"). 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Gibson Cryogenics, Inc., a Utah corporation, with C. John 
Gibson, individually and as President and Lewis E. Young as Secretary/Treasurer, 
("Debtor") has/have applied to the Beneficiary for a aortgage loan in the 
aoount of One Million One Hundred Thousand and NO/100 Dollars ($1,100,000.00), 
to be evidenced by its Promissory Note, ("Note"), in that aaount dated the 28th 
day of October, 1983, secured by a Deed of Trust with Security Agreeaent and 
Assignaent of Rents, ("Deed of Trust"), bearing the saae date as the Note; and 
WHEREAS,'the Beneficiary is unwilling to sake said loan unless Guarantor 
guarantees the payment of principal and interest, and any other charges pro-
vided for in the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument 
securing the Note, and the performance by the Debtor of all the covenants 
on its part to be performed and observed pursuant to the provisions thereof; 
and 
WHEREAS, Guarantor desires to give such guaranty to Beneficiary in 
order to induce Beneficiary to make said loan; 
NOV, THEREFORE, in consideration of the aforesaid premises, for the 
purpose of inducing Beneficiary to make the aforementioned mortgage loan 
to Debtor, and other good and valuable consideration, Guarantor hereby; 
1. Unconditionally and absolutely guarantees the due and punctual 
payment of the principal of the Note, the interest thereon and any other 
monies due or which may become due thereon, and the due and punctual per-
formance and observance by the Debtor of all the other terms, covenants and 
conditions of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument 
securing the Note, whether according to the present terms thereof, at an 
earlier or accelerated date or dates as provided therein, or pursuant to 
any extension of time or to any change or changes in the terms, covenants, 
and conditions thereof now or at any time hereafter made or granted. 
2. Waives diligence, presentment, protest, notice of dishonor, demand 
for payment, extension of time of payment, notice of acceptance of this 
Guaranty, nonpayment at maturity and indulgences and notices of every kind, 
and consents to any and all forbearances and extensions of the time of pay-
ment of the Note, Deed of Trust or any other document or instrument securing 
the Note, and to any and all changes in the terms, covenants and conditions 
thereof hereafter made or granted and to any and all substitutions, exchanges 
or releases of all or any part of the collateral therefore; it being the 
intention hereof that Guarantor shall remain liable as principal until the 
full amount of the principal of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document 
or instrument securing the Note, with interest and any other sums due or to 
become due thereon, shall have been fully paid and the terms, covenants and 
conditions shall have been fully performed and observed by Debtor, notwith-
standing any act, omission or thing which might otherwise operate as a legal 
discharge of the Guarantor. 
3. Agrees that he shall have no right of subrogation whatsoever with 
respect to the aforesaid indebtedness, or to any monies due and unpaid thereon 
or any collateral securing the same; unless and until Beneficiary shall have 
received payment in full of all sums at any time secured by the Deed of Trust 
or any other document or instrument securing the Note. 
4. Agrees that this Guaranty may be enforced by Beneficiary without 
first resorting to or exhausting any other security or collateral or without 
first having recourse to the Note or any of the property covered by the Deed 
of Trust or other document or instrument securing the Note through foreclosure 
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GUARANTY 
proceedings, trustee's sale or otherwise; provided, however, that nothing 
herein contained shall prevent Beneficiary froa suing on the Mote or fore-
closing upon or initiating a trustee's sale under the Deed of Trust or other 
document or instrument securing the Note or from exercising any other rights 
thereunder; and, if such foreclosure, sale or other remedy is availed of 
only the net proceeds therefrom, after deduction of all charges and expenses 
of every kind and nature whatsoever, shall be applied in reduction of the amount 
due on the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument securing 
the Note, and Beneficiary shall not be required to prosecute or institute pro-
ceedings to recover any deficiency as a condition of payment hereunder or en* 
dorsement hereof. At any sale of the security or collateral for the indebted-
ness or any part thereof, whether by foreclosure or otherwise, Beneficiary 
may at its discretion purchase all or any part of such collateral so sold 
or offered for sale for its own account and may apply against the amount 
bid therefor the balance due it pursuant to the terms of the Note or Deed 
of Trust or any other document or instrument securing the Note. 
5. Agrees that in the event this Guaranty is placed in the hands of 
an attorney for enforcement, the Guarantor will reimburse the Beneficiary 
for all expenses incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees, with or 
without litigation having been filed, and if filed, including any attorney's 
fees in any trial or appellate court. 
6. Agrees that this Guaranty shall mure to the benefit of and may be 
enforced by Beneficiary, and any subsequent holder and/or Beneficiary of the 
Note and Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument securing the Note 
and shall be binding upon and enforceable against the Guarantor and the 
Guarantor's legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns. 
7. Agrees that the indebtedness of Debtor to Beneficiary, covered 
by this Guaranty shall be and the same hereby is declared to be orior to 
any claim that Guarantor may now have or hereafter acquire against Debtor, 
whether or not Debtor becomes insolvent, and Guarantor shall and does expressly 
subordinate any such claim Guarantor may have against Debtor, upon any account 
whatsoever, to any claim that Beneficiary has against Debtor based upon the 
indebtedness covered by this Guaranty. In the event of insolvency and conse-
quent liquidation of the assets of Debtor, through bankruptcy, by an assignment 
for the benefit of creditors, by voluntary liquidation, or otherwise, the assets 
of Debtor applicable to the payment of the claims of both Beneficiary and 
Guarantor shall be paid to Beneficiary and shall be first applied by Bene-
ficiary to all claims which it may have or acquire against Debtor or any 
assignee or trustee in bankruptcy of Debtor; provided that such assignment 
shall be effective only for the purpose of assuring the Beneficiary full 
payment of all indebtedness of Debtor to Beneficiary covered by this Guaranty. 
8. Agrees that assignment by Beneficiary of all or part of the indebt-
edness covered by this Guaranty shall transfer to the assignee all benefits 
of this Guaranty as to the portion of such indebtedness assigned. This Guaranty 
shall remain m effect in favor of the Beneficiary as to the portion of such 
indebtedness not assigned. Guarantor further agrees that if payment is made 
by Debtor on the debt guaranteed hereby and thereafter Beneficiary is forced 
to remit the amount of that payment to the Debtor trustee in bankruptcy or 
similar person under any federal or state bankruptcy law or law for the re-
lief of debtor, the Debtor debt shall be considered unpaid for the purpose 
of enforcement of this Guaranty. 
9. Agrees that notice by Beneficiary of the acceptance of this 
Guaranty is hereby waived, and that this Guaranty may be assigned to any 
holder of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document or instrument 
securing the Note. 
10c Agrees that no act or omission of any kind by Beneficiary shall 
affect or impair this Guaranty, and Beneficiary shall have no duties to the 
Guarantor. 
11. Agrees that their obligations hereunder shall be absolute and 
primary and shall be complete and binding upon this Guaranty being executed 
by it and subject to no conditions precedent or otherwise. 
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GUARANTY 
12. Agrees that the terms of this Guaranty nay not be changed or 
modified in any way except by a writing executed by the holder or Bene-
ficiary of the Note, Deed of Trust, and any other document or instrument 
securing the Note. 
13. Agrees that this Guaranty shall be specifically enforceable by 
the holder or Beneficiary of the Note, Deed of Trust and any other document 
or instrument securing the Note, in the event of a sale or transfer of the 
collateral covered by the Deed of Trust or other document or instrument se-
curing the Note, or any part of such collateral, which sale is an event of 
default under the Deed of Trust or other document or instrument securing 
the Note, even though such holder does not accelerate, in whole or in part, 
the indebtedness so secured, and even though there is no right in such holder 
to accelerate the indebtedness so secured, in whole or in part. 
14. Agrees this Guaranty contains the full agreement of the Guarantor 
and is not subject to any oral conditions. 
15. Agrees that the obligations hereunder shall be continuing and irre-
vocable until said mortgage loan and all charges provided for in the Note, 
Deed of Trust or other document or instrument securing the Note have been 
completely satisfied and paid m full. 
Each of the undersigned Guarantor and Additional Guarantor hereby consents 
to and submits himself to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah and agrees 
that the Beneficiary under the aforementioned Note shall be entitled to a 
judgement and decree and enforcement by the courts of the State of Utah for 
any amount which may be adjudged to be paid to the Beneficiary by any such 
court of the state, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees, interest 
and reasonable costs. Further, the Secretary of State for the State of Utah 
and his successors in the office shall be the agent f«r «*rvice *£ process 
on the undersigned Guarantor and Additional Guarantor within the State of Utah 
with respect to any such suit. 
Copies of any legal process affecting the undersigned shall be forwarded to: 
Bonneville Industries, Inc. Levis E. Young 
2893 Sunrise Boulevard c/o Gibson Cryogenics, Inc. 
Suite #212 9501 West 900 South, P.O. Box 2388 
Rancho Cordova, California 95670 Ogden, Utah 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary written above, the undersigned 
Additional Guarantor hereby unconditionally and absolutely guarantees the 
performance of Bonneville Industries, Inc., a Nevada corporation, according 
to and upon the same terms as contained in this Guaranty Agreement. It is 
specifically understood by all parties to this agreement that Guarantor 
guarantees said performance of Debtor and the Additional Guarantor guarantees 
the performance of Guarantor only. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Guarantor and Additional Guarantor have executed this 
instrument the day and year first above mentioned. 
GUARANTOR: 
BONNEVILLE INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a Nevada corporation 
C^/V >/* ^rh^^ \ ,rsxsftn. rJW. VWrnrv 
Cary Ly*oun<, President / Cristy Ley YtfiingTSecretary Q 
ADDITIONAL GUARANTOR: 
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